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This paper explores Levinas’s Carnets de captivité and Écrits sur la 
captivité in light of Badiou’s category of “antiphilosophy.” We make four 
movements here: first, a description of what antiphilosophy is; second, an 
explanation of why the category of antiphilosophy is important to a reading 
of Levinas; third, an exposition of the antiphilosophical elements of the 
Carnets and Écrits on captivity; fourth, we situate our reading of the 
notebooks within the larger context of Levinas’s post-captivity work. Our 
reading of Levinas on and from captivity is not the first. In particular, it is 
preceded by Seán Hand’s “Salvation through Literature: Levinas’s Carnets de 
Captivité” and Howard Caygill’s “Levinas’s Prison Notebooks.”1 Both 
articles offer accounts of how to read the notebooks. The former makes the 
claim that the notebooks are “an intense inner reflection” that serves as a 
“metaethical resistance to […] philosophical totality”, specifically that of 
Heidegger.2 The latter provides a detailed overview of the biographical and 
historical contexts relevant to the writing and posthumous publication of the 
Carnets. We accept the claims of both of these readings (they focus on 
different aspects of these writings), but we do more to connect the Carnets de 
captivité and Écrits sur la captivité to the rest of Levinas’s later work and to 
account for their philosophical importance. 
What is Antiphilosophy? 
The category of antiphilosophy is best understood by dividing it into 
two sets of criteria: “strict conditions” and “common themes/outlying 
criteria.” The strict conditions of antiphilosophy are those which Badiou 
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claims to be explicitly manifest in each antiphilosopher he names. As for the 
“common themes,” there is a higher degree of variance in the form and 
quality of the criteria under consideration: they appear to linger in the 
background. These two types of criteria can be gleaned from Badiou’s texts 
through slightly different methods: while the strict conditions are generally 
enumerated and schematized at the beginning of an essay or chapter in 
order to structure it or to set up its coordinates, the “common themes” are 
often found as less formal supplementary commentary in the bodies of texts 
and serve to bolster the main argument. We begin by outlining three strict 
criteria, which are as follows: 
a) Dethroning the role, conditions, limits, and possibilities 
of truth. As Bruno Bosteels notes in the introduction to 
Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy, Lacan—Badiou’s definitional 
antiphilosopher—holds onto a notion of truth, and this is 
what distinguishes his work from sophistry. Where the 
sophist is content to subordinate truth to the rule, 
rendering it a mere effect of language—thereby destroying 
it—the antiphilosopher always accords a role to truth, 
albeit dethroned and only half-sayable.3 Nevertheless, 
Badiou’s antiphilosopher “often delves into the resources 
that sophistics exploit as well.”4 
b) Defacing the image of philosophy as essentially and 
primarily propositional, discursive, and theoretical. 
Philosophy is exposed as an act which is in some sense 
insufficient: the antiphilosopher shows the “truths” of 
philosophy to be externally motivated and not self-
grounding. This can consist in exposing desires which 
underlie or motivate philosophy and philosophers, as in 
the case of Nietzsche and Lacan, rendering the strictly 
discursive appearance of philosophy null.  
c) Emphasis on a “radically new act”—an act 
heterogeneous to the categories of philosophy, which, in 
turn, seeks to show or expose in some way non-thought, 
i.e., that which the propositions of science and philosophy 
cannot express.5 The antiphilosopher “disparage[s] the 
philosopher’s act in the name of another act, one that 
would be far more radical than anything the metaphysical 
search for truth could ever hope to deliver.”6 This new act 
overcomes the philosophical act affirmatively: it takes up 
and privileges the beyond, the Real, the mystical. This act 
may be called philosophical, but is “more honestly, 
supraphilosophical or even aphilosophical.”7  
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These three conditions make up the necessary elements for any 
antiphilosophy. It should be noted that the thinkers that Badiou nominates 
are not necessarily always antiphilosophical; rather, they have 
antiphilosophical moments. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, for example, is taken as 
a supreme work of antiphilosophy; Philosophical Investigations, on the other 
hand, slips into sophistry. This relation, or rather, this demarcation of the 
line between antiphilosophy and sophistry is thin; it can, however, be 
further clarified with recourse to the “common themes” or outlying criteria 
of antiphilosophy. 
Common Themes 
Taken in conjunction, these previous three points—the deposing of the 
category of truth, the discovery of the philosophical act underlying 
philosophy, and the affirmation of a radically new act—lead to a concept of 
the “remainder”: that which is not accounted for in thinking. The “idea of 
the ‘remainder’ can be found in every antiphilosophy”; in fact, it is with the 
remainder that “antiphilosophy deposes philosophy: by showing what its 
theoretical pretention has missed and which in the end is nothing less than 
the real.”8 The remainder serves to shake the philosopher’s epistemology: 
often, it is not something which simply has yet to be thought, but that which 
cannot be thought from within philosophy, within any given 
social/historical context. The remainder is what the antiphilosopher 
attempts to present, or at least trace, in order to show the limits of truth, the 
proposition, discourse, theory, and so on. Thus the idea of the remainder is 
an identifier of antiphilosophy in potentia.  
Unfortunately, the discussion of the remainder often takes the form of a 
“striking misogyny which characterizes all antiphilosophers.”9 While the 
question of Levinas’s misogyny reaches much further than the scope of this 
paper, suffice it to say at this point that misogyny generally takes the form 
either of subordinating the other to the same (feminine to the masculine) or 
otherwise essentializing the feminine in or as a mysterious ‘dark 
continent’.”10 In either case, the masculine voice is presupposed as the 
foundation from which the feminine is derived. Badiou gives some examples 
from the personal lives of the antiphilosophers, which often bleed through 
into their writing: “Pascal (did he ever notice one other than his sister?), 
Rousseau (Émile’s Sophie!), Kierkegaard (the neurosis of marriage!),” and so 
on.11 
Finally, there is the relationship that antiphilosophers have, in the last 
instance, to philosophy proper. Badiou tells us that “there is in 
antiphilosophy a movement of putting itself to death, or silencing itself, so 
that something may be bequeathed to philosophy.”12 This self-effacement 
can take many forms: “Nietzsche’s madness,” “Wittgenstein’s strange 
labyrinth,” “Lacan’s final muteness.”13 This is akin to saying that 
antiphilosophers proceed from their own lives, their own existential 
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situations, outward toward philosophy’s failure to think. Philosophy, 
however, always recuperates the remainder in the end: antiphilosophy is in 
a sense always a willful martyr to a reformed philosophy.  
Why Antiphilosophy? 
Now that we have discussed what it is, let us turn our attention to what 
it does: What does antiphilosophy give us that philosophy does not? Why 
concern ourselves with the nomination and categorization of 
antiphilosophers, rather than simply engage with their ideas 
philosophically? 
The clearest answer Badiou provides can be found in the preface to 
Wittgenstein’s Antiphilosophy. There he argues that antiphilosophy serves to 
awaken philosophers to two specific points they often miss: the historical 
contingency of philosophical thinking, and the authoritarian nature of 
philosophical claims.14 
 The historical contingency of philosophy is tied to the historical 
movement of its truth conditions. The conditions of philosophy—art, 
politics, science, and love—are the genres in which truths can propriate or 
manifest. Truths are functions of events, and events are subtractive—an 
irruption of the void into the regular course of being. Since an event is 
wholly unthinkable from the point of view of the situation which precedes it 
(the situation which gets interrupted by the event), it follows that 
philosophy cannot produce truths of its own: strictly speaking, there are no 
events in philosophy. In fact, all philosophy can do is think the 
compossibility of its four truth conditions: the task of philosophy is to 
discover or extract from the historical event the eternal and universal laws 
that govern each and every event. It is often through the “suturing” of 
philosophy to one of its four conditions (to the detriment of the others) that 
this fact of historical contingency is forgotten, and this forgetting leads to 
disaster. A prime example is Heidegger’s suture to poetry (art), leading 
through nostalgic valorization of a more “pure” historical moment, to his 
eventual Nazism.15 
 In drawing attention to the historicity of thought, the antiphilosopher 
reminds the philosopher of the dangers of suture and the scope of 
philosophy. This is done, in part, through the same movement which alerts 
the philosopher to the authoritarian voice of philosophy itself—the second 
“function” of antiphilosophy for the philosopher.  By vigorously submitting 
one’s own existence, one’s own body, to the work at hand, the 
antiphilosopher draws attention to the “seductive” and “violent” element 
present in any philosophy insofar as it beckons others to follow, criticizes 
contemporaries, and so on. In putting one’s life at stake against the “throes 
of philosophy,” the antiphilosopher “chooses the philosophers whom he 
hopes to make into the canonical examples of the empty and vain shell of a 
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word that for him is philosophy.”16 In other words, there is always another 
philosopher who, for the antiphilosopher, is the culmination or foundation 
of contemporary thought: “Pascal against Descartes, Rousseau against the 
Encyclopedists, Kierkegaard against Hegel, Nietzsche against Plato, Lacan 
against Althusser.”17 As we will see below, the philosopher who determines 
contemporary thought for Levinas is Heidegger. 
 Thus far we have defined both the coordinates and the function of 
antiphilosophy as it is described by Badiou. We now turn to our reading of 
Levinas’s Carnets de captivité  and Écrits sur la captivité.  
Captivity 
 In the Carnets de captivité and the Écrits sur la captivité, Levinas sketches 
an antiphilosophical program according to Badiou’s strict criteria – and 
while the antiphilosophical character of the writings according to the non-
strict, outlying criteria is less conclusive, there are some clues to suggest that 
they are also pertinent, in some measure, when applied to Levinas.18   
Recall that the strict criteria of antiphilosophy are: a) a critique of 
philosophy’s statements; a deposing of the category of truth, a critique of 
philosophy as theory; b) the unmasking of a non-philosophical act at the 
bottom of philosophy’s statements; c) the affirmative overcoming of 
philosophy through a non- or supra-philosophical act, often also called 
philosophical. Our hypothesis is that Levinas’s prison writings sketch 
precisely such a program upstream of his later, mature thought – which, to 
repeat, is not to discount and in no way precludes the hermeneutical 
importance of his other writings in also building the antiphilosophical 
reading. 
First, our claim is that in the writings from and about captivity Levinas 
deposes the category of truth and overcomes philosophy affirmatively 
(fulfilling strict categories a) and c)) by privileging an ontic category with 
particular ontological import – namely, being Jewish, or the being-Jewish of 
the prisoner of war. Since the “Jewish experience of the prisoner” is an 
experience of radical hope, a kind of passive act or active passivity 
undergirding yet simultaneously outstripping the statements of the Jewish 
philosopher – or, as it were, the Jewish journal-keeper – the ethical thus 
deposes the category of truth.19 This is because radical hope emerges in the 
spiritual transition of the Jewish POW to complete passivity with respect to 
God – becoming a child, putting oneself completely in God’s hands.20 The 
relation to God is thus the ethical relation par excellence, inasmuch as it is a 
deliverance of oneself entirely into radical alterity. It is, moreover, a relation 
of radical “paternité”— the situation of the child under the authority of the 
father is one where “un autre existe pour vous.”21 As for philosophy itself, 
Levinas states explicitly that it is “initialement morale” and thus a) being-
Jewish is eminently philosophical and b) Dasein and je suis insufficiently 
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so.22 This is the gesture that overcomes philosophy affirmatively. Levinas’s 
own “philosophy”, being moral, is in Badiou’s terms archi-ethical.23  
Thus far, we have argued in broad terms for the pertinence of strict 
criteria a) and c)—deposing the category of truth and uncovering the non-
philosophical act—in reading Levinas’s writings from and about captivity. 
The details now need to be filled in. 
A persistent theme in the Carnets de captivité is the falling away of 
curtains and veils – symbolizing the nudity of human existence, laid bare in 
wartime but in particular by the experience of the POW camps. With French 
bourgeois life having been suspended by a completely different, flattened 
and impoverished order, one in which the POWs could nonetheless survive 
with a modicum of dignity and ethical integrity, the camps indicated the 
inessential nature of pre-war life and thus hinted at a) the crisis of pre-war 
bourgeois sociality and b) the possibility of a reorganized society.24 In this 
respect, the experience of the prisoner of war camps was paradoxically 
liberating. It was an experience that pierced the veil of pre-war doxa and, we 
may fairly reconstruct from Levinas’s entries, spurred him to think the archi-
ethical, essentially erotic conditions of sociality in a radically liberated way.  
So far so good: to this extent, Levinas and other Jewish prisoners of war 
participated in a general destiny of imprisonment with other POWs, and this 
had a liberating effect on all.25 One might speak in Badiou’s fashion of an 
event that punctures a hole in knowledge– in this case, a form of life beyond 
what the prevailing wisdom deemed possible or even thinkable, which had, 
by subtraction, made itself manifest in and through the POW camps.  
Following Badiou, one might also speak of this truth as being, in principle, 
universal in its address. The challenge arises however in connection with 
Levinas’s insistence, sketched here and there in the Carnets, that he begin 
methodologically not from Dasein or even the je suis, but rather from the je-
suis-juif – “I am a Jew” – as an ontological category.26 The je-suis-juif, over 
and above the je suis, involves creation, paternity, election and persecution.  
Levinas’s methodological commitment to the je-suis-juif is, effectively, a 
declaration that the particularity of his ontic condition as a Jew and as a 
Jewish prisoner has ontological import – that the Jew in general, and the 
Jewish prisoner of war in particular, begin from a place of privilege in 
thinking the universal through the falling of the social curtain. Thus Judaism 
stands as the site of “une nouvelle interprétation de l’homme et de sa 
subjectivité.”27  
Note that this appears to be the stark opposite to the program of the 
great antiphilosopher Paul, who in Badiou’s construction founds 
universalism precisely in declaring the indifference of ontic, cultural-legal 
categories (Jew or Greek, man or woman, circumcised or uncircumcised).28 
Note also that in starting from the je-suis-juif, Levinas is departing from 
Heidegger on ontological and methodological as well as national-political 
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grounds.29 The choice is stark: start from Dasein or start from Judaism.30 One 
must be cautious here however in reading Levinas as a thinker of the Jewish 
nation. He does not pose the Jewish nation as a mirror to Heidegger’s 
Germany, and it is precisely Heidegger’s specificity to have thought “la 
nation comme accès au réel.”31 A recently published letter from Levinas to 
Maurice Blanchot from 1948, on the occasion of the founding of the state of 
Israel, bears this out by detailing Levinas’s “réticences.”32 
This tension between the particular and the universal in Judaism, 
between interstitial wandering and state power, was of course not Levinas’s 
discovery; it was already explored for instance in Freud’s Moses and 
Monotheism, which had appeared at the outset of the war. The novelty of 
Levinas’s writings on captivity was to have posed, against Sartre for 
instance, the figure of the Jew and the ontological category of being-Jewish 
in terms of their primordial and universal significance: namely, the extent to 
which they speak to the impossibility of fleeing one’s own condition. While 
particularly acute in the ontic case of the Jew harassed by anti-Semitism in 
general and Hitlerism in particular, this condition speaks quite broadly to 
the natural state of the human soul. Levinas will in another context say quite 
plainly that the human soul is “perhaps naturally Jewish.”33 
In drawing ontological implications from Jewish facticity, Levinas notes 
how the Jewish POWs were set apart from the rest.34 This already 
complicates the notion of a universal experience of incarceration. But a 
deeper, intra-Jewish epistemological challenge emerges in his radio address 
to La voix d’Israël. Speaking of the “Jewish experience of the prisoner” – and 
note, not of the “experience of the Jewish prisoner” – he states that Jewish 
prisoners of war such as himself did not play the first role in the wartime 
drama of European Judaism.35 This unenviable role went to those who were 
interred in the death camps and – though he does not state it explicitly – 
actually lived the drama to its limit in being sacrificed. The epistemological 
challenge arises in connection with Levinas’s claim that the Jewish POW’s 
experience was an authentically “Jewish experience” when it was not, by his 
own admission, the limit experience of Jewish incarceration during the war. 
Precisely this challenge persisted, albeit in a highly pernicious form when, in 
the 1980s, Robert Faurisson built his Holocaust denial on the shoddy 
reasoning that, since the only authentic witness to the gas chambers would 
be someone killed in the gas chambers, there were in fact no gas chambers 
(this line of reasoning being explored and all but demolished by Lyotard in 
The Differend). 
 This epistemological problem is mitigated by the fact that, since Jewish 
POWs were segregated and heard whispers of news about the death camps, 
they underwent something of a perpetually deferred experience of the fate 
reserved for the deportees: “Tout se passait comme si quelque chose se 
preparait pour eux, mais s’ajournait toujours.”36 Levinas invokes Abraham 
and Isaac on the road to Isaac’s ordained sacrifice in illustration of this 
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condition; he imagines the three days’ journey and its pregnant silences.37 
Precisely as with Abraham and Isaac, an interval emerged between the 
Jewish POW and his future suffering. Where the interval was experienced as 
supportable, it took on a properly Judaic cast. “Dans cet intervalle, se glisse 
la méditation; c’est là que la vie spirituelle commence.”38 In the worst period 
of the war, when the Allies were on the defensive, the Jewish POW found 
himself alone with God, completely in his hands, and radically passive.39 
What is Judaism after all, asks Levinas? It is a condition of radical hope: 
“avant l’espoir, au fond de la désesperance – de la douleur en bonheur; la 
découverte dans la souffrance même des signes d’élection.”40 Levinas claims 
that he has confidence in God: “Non pas qu’il fera tout selon mon désir. 
Mais je sais qu’en dernier ressort j’aurai affaire à Lui. C’est cela la confiance. 
Je suis entre ses mains. La douleur – peut aller à l’ infini. Elle a quelque 
chose d’enivrant – car en elle se fait ma passivité au sein de Dieu et mon 
élection.”41 And elsewhere: “Et c’est là aussi … dans ce découragement que 
personne ne aurait comprendre – que se révèle la présence divine. Situation 
du « subir » pur ou il y a une élection au sens de … l’amour d’une personne 
qui vous effleure {caresse}. Ou plutôt révélation d’un ordre différent de 
l’ordre naturel – réel malgré tous les échecs ds [sic] l’ordre naturel. – Ivresse 
de cette souffrance inutile, de cette passivité pur par laquelle on devient 
comme le fils de Dieu. Enfance.”42 Thus the Jewish POW, finding God in the 
interval between his imprisonment and his slaughter, has an authentically 
“Jewish experience” of being a prisoner – especially considering that, as 
Levinas puts in the notebooks, he finds in persecution the original sense of 
Judaism, “son emotion initiale. Non pas persécution quelconque –
persécution absolue, qui pourchasse l’être de partout pour l’enfermer dans 
le fait nu de son existence.”43 Note the temporality that this implies; the Jew, 
through divine election and hope, is in a position of rupture with any 
modern metaphysics of the pure present. 
The radical hope of the Jewish prisoner is specifically a hope that the 
weak will triumph over the strong. Elsewhere Levinas will say that “c’est 
cela tout le j[udaïsme].”44 Retrospectively, the succumbing of the strong – or 
at least, those making war in the name of the strong – to the weak bears out 
his radical hope – even taking account of the horrors of the Shoah. 
Anticipating the Pauline challenge, Levinas claims that “tout le 
christianisme” is already contained in this Judaic discovery of radical hope, 
which historically speaking predates it.45 
The Jewish prisoner’s awakened spirituality is, moreover, an act of life-
changing import. As Levinas puts it, his Judaism is like a sliver in the flesh; 
certainly he could live without it, but if so then his life would be deprived of 
“son acuité et de sa lucidité vigilante. Comme si on était émasculé. Ou 
retombé en enfance.”46 Finally, Levinas speaks of “Le néant de l’assimilé,” 
where we are tempted to read “assimilated Jew.”47 
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 So far what we have described fits nicely into Badiou’s strict categories 
a) and c). What about b), the lashing of philosophy as the propaganda of a 
non-philosophical act? While this is less clear, a case can be made in the 
writings from and about captivity that Levinas positions himself against a 
variously implicit and explicit anti-Semitic tradition of philosophical 
abstraction rooted in Greek thought but, in his own day, continued by 
Heidegger.  
 Thus in the writings from and on captivity, Levinas a) deposes the 
category of truth in favor of the archi-ethical; b) lashes philosophy, in the 
figure of Heidegger, the Greeks and anti-Semitic universalism, for serving 
the interests of the nation and obscuring the ethical nature of the human, 
ontological condition; c) overcomes philosophy affirmatively through the 
radical abnegation required by being-Jewish.48  
 Regarding Badiou’s outlying criteria – for example, the link between 
antiphilosophy and misogyny – we can only speculate. Take for instance one 
of his entries, where the feminine is cast as the category of the not-I, the 
other that is prior to any other. On one hand, the feminine emerges as the 
dark continent Badiou describes; on the other hand, that continent is—
properly speaking—ethics. To speak of “Levinas’s misogyny” in this 
connection would be simplistic.49 
Antiphilosophy Beyond Jewish Captivity 
Before we attempt to tie the knot of Levinas’s work in relation to the 
category of antiphilosophy, we must address this question: why doesn’t 
Badiou himself name Levinas an antiphilosopher? In what follows, we 
attempt only a partial answer for the sake of time and coherence.  
 Badiou’s most explicit remarks on Levinas can be found in his book 
Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil.50 Against Badiou’s reading of 
Levinas, we offer one small conjecture: that Badiou conflates the Other with 
God, thereby mistakenly understanding Levinas’s God to be an 
ontotheological God. Based on this reading, Badiou dismisses Levinasian 
ethics on two fronts: one being that it is sutured to theology, and the other 
that it leads to a weak politics.51 
 Badiou claims that we do not necessarily have an experience of the 
other as Other; that the other “always resembles me too much for the 
hypothesis of an originary exposure to his alterity to be necessarily true.”52 In 
light of this lack of guarantee of the properly ethical experience, Badiou 
moves to the claim that “ethics requires that the Other be in some sense 
carried by a principle of alterity which transcends mere finite experience”; 
furthermore, this principle is “quite obviously the ethical name for God.”53 
However, this critique already rests on the movement of totalizing 
or thematizing the Other within the Same, which Levinas painstakingly 
attempts to avoid. As Simon Critchley makes clear, “there is no simple and 
radical overcoming of ontological or logocentric language through the 
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ethical saying of the otherwise than Being, rather the ethical is the 
momentary interruption of the logos.”54 Precisely by attributing a kind of 
Heideggerian poetic-ontology to Levinas, wherein the twisting of language 
reveals the “beyond” of Being, Badiou fundamentally mischaracterizes the 
gesture Levinas makes: a gesture, or an act, which interrupts the logocentric 
delimitation of Being. It is this act which Derrida recognizes and receives. 
For Derrida, to “pay homage” to Levinas by returning this gift would be 
ultimately to desecrate his ethical project: he must instead efface Levinas, 
just as Levinas effaced himself, so as not to strip his existence of the 
interruptive/disruptive power it held.55 Badiou’s hasty equivocation—or 
rather, the equivocation he attributes to Levinas—of God with the Other, 
thus “completes the circle of restitution” and refuses the gift Levinas gives.56  
Ironically, Badiou himself does claim that Levinas has no 
philosophy—only an ethics.57 Although prima facie this seems to echo the 
language he uses to describe other antiphilosophers, Badiou divests himself 
of the means to recognize Levinas’s antiphilosophical gesture through a 
totalizing, ontological discourse. Levinas’s is an antiphilosophy that brushes 
up next to theology without accepting or relying on the mysticism therein—
does this not describe Kierkegaard, Pascal, Saint Paul? As Hilary Putnam 
eloquently stated in relation to Levinas, “the position of the traditional Jew 
is one of feeling a profound experience of a God (s)he has not had a 
numinous experience of.”58 
Conclusion 
To recap our brief intervention, Levinas’s Carnets de captivité and 
Écrits sur la captivité lend themselves to an antiphilosophical reading of his 
ethical project. We have argued that Levinas fulfills the three criteria of 
antiphilosophy—the deposing of the category of truth, the discovery of the 
non-philosophical act, and the insistence on a radically new act—first and 
foremost through his election of the position of the Jew against Dasein or je 
suis. The ethical thus deposes truth; starting from the Jewish position at once 
exposes the non-philosophical ontological starting point while 
simultaneously affirming a new, ethical one.  
 We also briefly speculated upon where Levinas stands with respect to 
the “outlying criteria” of antiphilosophy. Though the misogynistic elements 
of his philosophy were merely highlighted, we argued that Levinas meets 
the other two criteria: the presentation of a remainder and the self-
effacement or martyrdom native to any antiphilosophy. The presentation of 
the remainder, of course, resides in his phenomenological description of the 
Other, while self-effacement culminates in such statements as his lack of 
authority to really “speak of the Jewish experience of imprisonment” to the 
extent that the “true” witnesses died in captivity.  
 The relationship of the Carnets and Écrits to the category of 
antiphilosophy sheds light on the ways in which Judaism is apparently 
decisive in Levinas’s philosophical trajectory. While by no means ruling out 
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a broader reading of Levinas’s works in these terms, the writings from and 
about captivity illustrate and encapsulate the idea that the “Jewish 
experience of the prisoner,” thus the Jewish experience more generally, has 
primordial and universal ontological import. Inasmuch as this experience is 
eminently and above all ethical, these writings present us with the figure of 
a Levinas engaged in a valorization of the archi-ethical over the 
Greek/German philosophy of abstract universalism figured by Heidegger. It 
remains to be explored, however, why notwithstanding the plausibility of an 
antiphilosophical reading, Levinas has not played a role in Badiou’s 
antiphilosophical canon – and why his comments on Levinas have been 
variously ambivalent, strained, and generally unsatisfactory. 
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